BATTLE FOR CRETE

The battle began on 20 May when airborne troops of General Student's Fliegerkorps 11 began landing at both ends of the island.

It was hoped to hold Crete as a possible base from which to bomb the Romanian oilfields at Ploesti, but the island's geography made a strong defence of it almost impossible. Most of the 35,000-strong British, Commonwealth, and Greek garrison had just escaped from Greece. It was not a single, coherent formation and only lightly armed. Transport, artillery and signals equipment were scarce or non-existent, while RAF support had been reduced to a handful of aircraft which exposed British warships to German dive-bombers.

The appreciation by the Joint Intelligence Committee foresaw an equally balanced German assault from both the air and the sea and the island's commander, Lt-General Freyberg, made his dispositions accordingly and as best as his scanty resources allowed.

It nearly failed, for the Germans had wildly underestimated the garrison's strength and ULTRA intelligence, which 'rarely gave so complete and accurate a forecast again' (R.Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 1941-1945, London, 1986, p.56), revealed in good time details of the plan. In particular, it showed that Freyberg's thinly-spread defences were inadequate to hold Malame airfield.

Contrary to what some historians have written Freyber's biographer states that the general was privy to ULTRA; and that, as the success of MERKUR depended on seizing the airfields, he wanted the defences of Maleme airfield reinforced, but was expressly forbidden from doing so to prevent any possibility of the ULTRA secret's being compromised (see P.Freyberg, Bernard Freyber VC, London, 1991).

Consequently, the airfield was seized on 21 May, and a mountain regiment was then landed there.

Although air and sea attacks dispersed or sank the German reinforcements sent from Milos, and the defences at Heraklion and Retimo caused heavy casualties, the loss of Maleme airfield proved crucial. A delayed counter-attack failed to recapture it and German air reinforcements were then quickly increased.

The next afternoon, after permission had been granted to evacuate, he ordered a retreat to Sphakia on the opposite side of the island.

The defenders around Heraklion were evacuated by British warships without incident, but those holding Retimo airfield could not be contacted and eventually had to surrender.

Luftwaffe air attacks wreaked havoc during the evacuation around Sphakia. In fact, so severe were naval losses -three cruisers and six destroyers sunk, seventeen other ships damaged- that the evacuation had to be abandoned after the night of 30 May, and 5,000 were left behind. Most of these were captured.

British and Commonwealth troop losses on Crete amounted to 1,742 killed ad missing, 2,225 wounded, and 11,370 captured, while the Royal Navy had 2,000 man killed and 183 wounded. But the Germans, too, had been badly mauled. Their casualties, estimated at about 7,000 killed, were so severe that they never again mounted a major airborne operation against enemy-occupied territory.

I.C.B.Dear, 

Oxford Companion to the Second World War (1995), pp.276,277