GREECE IN WW II - THE PRE-OCCUPATION GOVERNMENT
From the foundation of the independent state in the early 1830s, the UK, with France and Russia one of the original 'Protecting Powers', had exercised a preponderant influence over the external affairs of
Greece. None the less, the British government turned down the offer made in 1938 by the dictator General Ioannis Metaxas (1871-1941) of a formal alliance.In April 1938, however, following the Italian occupation of Albania, the UK and France undertook to guarantee the integrity of Greece and Romania provided they resisted aggression. Moreover, despite the adoption of some of the external trappings the fascism of Metaxas, and notwithstanding the high degree of German penetration of the economy, Greece's external relations, in part as consequence of pro-British proclinities of King George II, remained oriented towards the UK.
On the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939, Metaxas sought to maintain Greek neutrality, while being prepared to give some low-level assistance to the British war effort.
Hitler had sought to dominate south-east Europe through economic and political means.
Mussolini, on the other hand, was determined to make territorial gains at the expense of
Yugoslavia and Greece. In the summer of 1940, the Italian dictator adopted an increasingly menacing stand towards Greece, authorizing the torpedoing of the Greek cruiser 'Elli' stationed off the island of Tenos on 15 August.This and other provocations were followed by the presentation by the Italian ambassador in the early hours of 28 October of a calculatedly unacceptable ultimatum. Metaxas, authoritarian, unpopular, and unrepresentative though he was, captured the national mood in a dignified rejection of the ultimatum. (After the war 28 October was declared national holiday as 'Okhi' ('No!') day).
The ultimatum was followed three hours later by the Italian invasion of northwest Greece. This was quickly repulsed, with
Greek forces capturing a substantial area of southern Albania before the advance ground to a halt in atrocious weather.Shortly before his death on 29 January 1941, Metaxas refused Churchill's offer of ground troops for he was still hopeful of securing some accommodation with Italy through German intervention. However, in secret talks at the royal palace of Tatoi on 22/23 February between Alexandros Koryzis, the new prime minister, King George II, and C-in-C General Alexandros Papagos (1883-1955) on the Greek side and Anthony Eden, the British foreign secretary, Field-Marshal Dill, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and General Wavell, the C-in-C Middle East, on the British, it was agreed to dispatch an expeditionary force, composed largely of Australian and New Zealand troops.
A misunderstanding occurred at the Tatoi meeting which was seriously to diminish such chances as existed of a successful combined resistance to an increasingly imminent
German invasion. The British participants were under the impression that Papagos had agreed to an immediate withdrawal of Greek forces from the fortified Metaxas Line on the Bulgarian frontier to the natural defensive line of the Aliakmon River in Western Macedonia, there to link up with the British expeditionary force. Papagos, with reason in the light of the available evidence, understood such a withdrawal to be contingent on the prior determination of Yugoslavia's willingness to resist the Germans.The delay critically impeded resistance to the German invasion, (MARITA) launched on 6 April 1941.
In the chaos of the invasion, Koryzis committed suicide. Emmanouil Tsouderos, Koryzis' successor as the legitimate prime minister, was in office for only three days before
withdrawing with King George and the rest of the government to Crete on 23 April as resistance to the invading German forces collapsed.
R.Clogg,
Oxford Companion to the Second World War (1995), p.504